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BAR BRIEFS
CO-OPERATIVES CAN BE IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE
By HUBERT E. NELSON*
Agassiz. the famous .naturalist, is said to have remarked that all
great scientific discoveries travel through three stages in their way to
final acceptance. First, people say the discovery conflicts with the Bible;
next, they say it has been discovered before; lastly, they say they have
always believed it. The history of the rise of co-operatives to respon-
sibility may in a way parallel the road of scientific discoveries. At the
turn of the century co-operative business enterprises were suspected and
maligned as in violation of the law prohibiting monopolies and unreason-
able restraints of trade. Today they- are pretty firmly established as
secure and scented with-propriety. Indeed, the post-war years may even
see a slight reaction in regard to them, as their relatively free tax status
is questioned and reexamined by lawmakers. Indicative of the trend
now is the account which appeared in the newspapers last year telling
of the serious study made by one of the largest mail order houses looking
towards the transformation of that business into the cooperative matrix.
There has had to be a radical about-face on the part of courts and
lawmakers to establish the co-operative business organization as legiti-
mate, and there has been this turn-about on the part of both Federal
and State determiners of policy. In 1900 the common law centuries old
doctrine aided by the Sherman Anti-Trust Act seemed fairly unqualified
to be an effective contraceptive legal bar to the birth of co-operative
business organizations. ,The common law doctrine with respect. to
monopoly and restraint of trade makes a first appearance in a recorded
case five hundred and thirty years ago when during the reign of Henry
V a certain dyer made a contract agreeing for six months not to carry
on his trade in the same town with the promisee, and the agreement in
question was held invalid In all liklihood today Equity would not
regard such a partial restraint as unreasonable and unenforceable. In
1602, the so-called Case of Monopolies' based the doctrine among other
things upon "the equity of the law of God, as appears in Deut. Chap.
24, verse 6... 'You shall not take in pledge the neather and upper mill-
stone, for that is his life.' (Ancient version)" During the reign of
Edward VI, Parliament prohibited forestalling, engrossing, and re-
grating', thus restricting trading in victuals and provisions and mani-
festing the intention of keeping the distance very short between producer
and consumer. But Parliament repealed the entire Act in 1844. stating
that the prohibited conduct had come to be considered favorable rather
than unfavorable to the development of trade.
How were co-operatives faring in the year 1902? The outstanding
Connelly Case' throws some light upon the situation. An Illinois anti-
trust act declared that "the provision of this act shall not apply to
agricultural products while in the hands of the producer or raiser." In
that case when Connelly was sued by the Sewer Pipe Company on two
notes given by him on account of the purchase of sewer pipe, he defended
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Year Books, 2 Hen. V.
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on the ground that the plaintiff was a trust and that the applicable anti-
trust act of Illinois specifically. provided that any purchaser from a
corporation of any article was not liable for the price if the seller was
operating as a trust. The Sewer Company argued that the antitrust act
aforesaid was void, because its exemption of products in the hands of
producers violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution of the
United States. The Supreme Court upheld the contention of the com-
pany. The decision even at the time actually was not one holding that
farmers are barred from forming co-operative associations; it merely
invalidated the antitrust statute of Illinois and, presumably, any others
like it. Nevertheless the Connelly Case was looked upon for a generation
as controlling against the constitutionality of state co-operative marketing
statutes. But in 1928 the case of Liberty Warehouse Company v. Burley
Tobacco Growers' Co-operative Association' manifested an attitude
favorable to the right of states to provide expressly for the organization
of co-operative association; and finally five years ago the Connelly Case
was expressly overruled.!
And the position of co-operatives must also be examined in the
light of acts of Congress and judicial interpretations thereof, this being
particularly necessary when interstate activities are present. The Sher-
man Anti-Trust Act' passed by Congress in 1890 declared illegal and
criminal "every contract, combination, in form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce" in any territory or the
District of Columbia or in interstate commerce. An amendment was
proposed to this Act which would have excepted persons engaged in
agriculture or horticulture, but it failed of acceptance.! In the construing
of the Act, the Supreme Court -has held that only unreasonable restraints
are illegal. In Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. United States,'
the Court said: "The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed
is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby encourages competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition." But in
cases where manufacturers of the same product have agreed upon a
price schedule, the Court has looked upon the price fixing in itself as a
violation of the Sherman Act and has refused to look into the reason-
ableness of such prices."
As the interest in agricultural co-operatives became more insistent
after 1900. Congress moved to clarify somewhat their position under the
Sherman Act by practically amending the Act in certain particulars.
The Clayton Act' was passed in 1914 and Section 6 of this provides:
"Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid
the existence and operation of .... agricultural and horticultural organi-
zations, instituted for the purpose of* mutual help. and not having capital
stock or conducted for profit . . . nor shall such organizations be held
or be construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of
trade, under the antitrust laws."
This Clayton Act has been held to protect agricultural organizations
from being broken up as illegal or deemed combinations in restraint of
' 276 U.S. 71, 48 Sup. Ct. 291, 72 L. Ed. 473, (1928).
' Tignerv. Texas, 310 U. S. 141, 60 Sup. Ct. 879, 84 L. Ed. 1124, (1940).
See a helpful annotation on this case and point in 130 A. L. R. 1321.
26 Stat. 209. 15 U.S.C.A., 1.
' Cong. Record, 51st Congress, 1st Sess. p. 2726.
246 U. S. 231, 38 Sup. Ct. 242, 62 L. Ed. 683, (1918).
10 U. S. v. Trenton Pottery Co., 273 U. S. 392, 47 Sup. Ct. 377, 71 L. Ed.
700, (1927).
38 Stat. 730, 731, 15 U.S.C.A. 12.
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trade but as no mandate in the least for the carrying on of business by
methods not permitted to other lawful business organizations. In the
case of the United States v. King2 the Aroostook Potato Shippers'
Association was engaged in blacklisting and boycotting certain potato
buyers. The Court ruled that Section 6 of the Clayton Act was no
defense to the defendants, members of the Association, and held that
coercion of outstiders by a secondary boycott was not a lawful means
of carrying out the legitimate objects of the organization.
The Clayton Act, by its terms, was limited to agricultural organiza-
tions having no capital stock and not organized for profit. Early in
1922 another Act passed by Congress went into effect-the Capper-
Volstead Act", and it is not limited to nonstock organizations. Its title is
"An act to authorize association of producers of agricultural products."
To come within its provisions and benefit thereby it is required that the
association be operated for the mutual benefit of members, as producers,
and conform to either one or both of the following prerequisites: (a) no
member is to have more than one vote; (b) the dividends on stock or
membership capital must not exceed 8 per centum per annum. And
in no case shall the association deal in products of non-members to an
amount greater in value than such handling by it for members.
The Clayton Act is, in effect, an amendment of the antitrust law,
authorizing and sanctioning the elimination of competition among farmers
by their acting through co-operative associations. As Mr. L. S. Hulbert
expressed it on page 145 of a most comprehensive bulletin" he prepared
a few years ago for the Farm Credit Administration: ". . . . the funda-
mental object and result of the Capper-Volstead Act are to authorize
farmers to unite in organizations that may or may not be incorporated,
which organizations, insofar as the assembling, the processing. the
handling and the marketing of the products dealt in by the association
are concerned may act with the same force and effect as though all the
agricultural- products in question were being handled by one farmer."
But the Clayton and Capper-Volstead Acts would be erroneously
interpreted if regarded as laying down the bars for any course of conduct
which as association under them might pursue. For example, if such an
association engaged in unfair competition it would undoubtedly have to
defend itself against the Federal Trade Commission. while other culpable
and improper conduct might subject it to the jurisdiction of the Depart-
mient of Justice of the United States as in violation of the anti-trust laws.
Nor should it be overlooked that the Capper-Volstead Act does not
apply to purely purchasing associations, co-operative store, or associa-
tions engaged in rendering business services to farmers, as these are
neither expressly nor impliedly included within its terms.
The Capper-Volstead Act does not provide for incorporation of
co-operatives. For this one must look to state laws. The Act can
scarcely be looked upon as encouraging the stifling or restricting of
production. It deals only with organizations which engage in interstate
commerce and which have met the conditions specified by the Act; and
these organizations must be engaged in processing, preparing for market,
handling, and marketing in interstate or foreign commerce. And under
this Act there are safeguards against the charging of excessive prices
229 F. 275, 250 F. 908, 910. (1915).
lS 42 Stat. at Large 388, 77 U.S.C. 291 and 292.
" Bulletin No. 50, May 1942. "Legal Phrases of Cooperative Associa-
tions," Farm Cred. Adm., U.S. Dept. of Agric.
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for products by co-operatives. Section 2 of the Act gives to the Secre-
tary of Agriculture authority to enforce in federal courts orders he may
make to prevent monopolizing or restraining of trade by such associa-
tions when the Secretary has "reason to believe ... that the price of any
agricultural product is unduly enhanced." The effectiveness of Section
2 will admittedly depend upon what the Secretary of Agriculture believes
in respect to "enhanced" prices, and he probably will be slow to dis-
courage good prices for farm products.
Section 2 has been held by the Supreme Court in the recently
decided Borden Case" not to give immunity from the operation of the
Sherman Act in the absence of a proceeding by the Secretary. This case
held that if co-operatives enter into conspiracies or combinations with
third persons they are as amendable to prosecution under the antitrust
laws as are any other organizations. The Borden Company was held
not protected by the Capper-Volstead Act when it had engaged in con-
spiracies with major distributors and other allied groups designed to
maintain artificial and non-competitive prices on fluid milk. The Sec-
retary of Agriculture had not acted under Section 2, and this failure by
him to act was no defense.
Turning now from the effects of Congressional Acts and' the
Federal Constitution upon co-operatives, we have now to see how states
laws impinge upon co-operative associations. Co-operatives are or-
ganized by conforming with the provisions of the applicable state law,
usually set out in specific chapters, while commonly the statutes gov-
erning private corporations in general must also be observed unless
expressly or impliedly excluded by the specific act.
North Dakota has a number of acts authorizing the creation of
co-operatives of various kinds. Thus the Legislature has provided for
the organizing of Co-operative Marketing Associations," of Mutual Aid
non-profit Co-operative Associations, " of Electric Co-operative Cor-
porations, (including rural plumbing)," of Co-operative associations or
corporations to engage in the following lines of business: agriculture.
grain elevator, dairy, mercantile, mining, manufacturing', mechanical and
telephone," of Co-operative Grazing Associations, ' and of Co-operative
Credit Unions.'
Section 146 of the Constitution of the State of North Dakota reads:
"Any combination between individuals, corporations. associa-
tions, or either, having for its object or effect the controlling of
any price of any product of the soil . . . . is prohibited and
hereby declared unlawful and against public policy. ... "
There are also statutory enactments pertaining to pools and trusts.
Section 51-0801 of the North Dakota Revised Code, 1943, reads:
"Any corporation organized under the laws of this state or
doing business in this state, or any partnership, association, or
individual, creating. entering into, or becoming a member of, or
a party to, any pool, trust agreement, contract, combination, or
confederation, to regulate or fix the price of any article of
" U. S. v. Borden Co. 308 U.S. 188, 60 Sup. Ct. 182, 84 L. Ed. 181 (1939)"
,5 N. D. Rev. Code, 1943, Ch. 4-07.
" N. D. Rev. Code, 1943, Ch. 10-12.
N. D. Rev. Code, 1943, Ch. 10-13.
'5 N. D. Rev. Code, 1943, Ch. 10-15.
N. D. Rev. Code, 1943, Ch. 36-08.N. D. Rev. Code, 1943, Ch. 6-06.
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merchandise, commodity, or property, or to fix or limit the
amount or quantity of any article, property, merchandise, or
commodity to be manufactured, mined, 1)roduced, exchanged,
or sold in this state, is guilty of a misdemeanor."
Pools or trusts are defined in Section 50-0802 as including combinations
for the purposes of, inter alia, "to create or carry out restrictions in
trade; to limit or reduce the production, or increase or reduce the price.
of property, merchandise, or commodities." Sources of Section 51-0801
and 51-0802 just quoted are all given as between 1895 and 1913. when
anti-trust sentiment was so much in flower.
Of course, there is nothing in the material quoted from the North
Dakota Constitution or Code which could very reasonably be taken as
prohibiting the formation of co-operatives. How literally are these
quoted materials to be interpreted, a question of some importance, as in
practice the normal cooperative usually does to some degree, however
slight in many instances, affect prices; this being probably most true
with reference to the public at large in cases of marketing co-operatives.
A marketing organization naturally hopes for best possible prices on its
products and commodities. The marketing contract between members
and co-operative can be specifically enforced and include terms for
liquidated damages as means of encouraging dealings exclusively with
the co-operative. Conceivably a marketing co-operative could obtain the
marketing rights as to all, or almost all, let us say, of sweet corn or
potatoes grown for resale within a large and controlling area.
If these commodities involve interstate commerce, it seems clear
that any attempt by even a co-operative marketing association to manip-
ulate prices would run afoul the Sherman Act and in some flagrant
instances arouse the Secretary of Agriculture to proceed under the
Capper-Volstead Act. What is interstate commerce is outside the scope
of this article. Our question is primarily the one of the practical force
and place of North Dakota law upon co-operatives. In making con-
clusions offered as answers to this questidn, we have little or no help
from any decided North Dakota cases. Hence the conclusions must be
based upon decisions elsewhere, upon analogies, trends, and the like.
Should any provisions of the chapters authorizing formation of
co-operatives conflict with Sections 51-0801 and 51-0802 of the Code.
there is sound authority for favoring the former, as all such chapters
have been enacted years later than the Code Sections 51-0801 and 51-
0802. Naturally, no specific authority is given in these later chapters
to manipulate prices or even to limit production. However, insofar as
marketing co-operatives are concerned, there is a specific statute which
says:
"No association organized under this chapter shall be deemed to
be a combination in restraint of trade or an illegal monopoly, or
an attempt to lessen competition or fix prices arbitrarily. The
marketing contracts or agreements between any such association
and its members, or any agreements authorized in this chapter,
shall not be considered illegal nor in restraint of trade. .."M
N. D. Rev. Code, 1943, Section 4-0733.
" Section 4-0727 provides for the marketing contract, authorizing
liquidated damages clauses and the use of injunctions and specific
performance. Early in the development of co-operatives provisions
for liquidated damages in the contract were held by many courts an
illegal restraint as stifling competition.
BAR BRIEFS
Undoubtedly the most serious obstacle to any kind of price control
by co-operatives under North Dakota Law is found in Section 146 of
the State Constitution, previously quoted, which outlaws combinations
having as their object the controlling of any price of any product of the
soil. In the face of this, how much effectiveness resides in the attempted
exemption of co-operative marketing associations from the bans of
monopoly, illegal restraint of trade, and so on, by the Legislature? It
is believed that if any case should arise under the Legislative exemption
aforementioned as in possible conflict with the State Constitution, the
modern trend and line of judicial decisions elsewhere would he strongly
persuasive and given to favoring co-operatives in all but extreme and
perverted instances of clear abuse of present rights and privileges. The
expressed sentiment of judicial decisions and legislation of the past
quarter of a century demonstrates plainly that a former hostility and
suspicion towards co-operatives has been supplanted by an attitude in
full tide today which supports their legality, particularly if they are
agricultural associations.
Definite recognition has been gained of the farmer's unique posi-
tion in our modern economy and a cogent appreciation registered of
the advisability and need for doing all within reason to maintain agricul-
ture and the farmer upon a stable and prosperous economic plane. The
natural individualism of the farmer competing for a living in a strongly
organized business world has called for teasing and encouraging such
individualism somewhat out of itself along the way of co-operation.
National prosperity and well-being in the long run cannot survive a
prolonged period of seriously ailing farm economy. The depressions
between the two World Wars have indelibly instructed us. WAhether we
shall swing too far in the other direction, in line with traditional Ameri-
can fashion of arriving at the proper middle-ground, is even a matter
agitating the fear and trepidation departments of some citizens today.
And it must never be overlooked that a great many activities of
co-operatives which are of gueat value and benefit to members are in no
sense directed at all towards price or production control. A co-opera-
tive is usually defined as an association not for profit. The shareholders
or members benefit from services received, from economies in buying
and selling which result from concerted and large scale transactions by
efficient, expert management, in the course of which prices of products
of the soil to the general public are not appreciably affected.
Returning to the Section 146 of the State Constitution we can
adopt a line of logic and argument that requires taking the Constitution
of the State literally and viewing any control or attempted control of the
price, say of sweet corn or potatoes by a co-operative in the State in any
slight appreciable degree, as unlawful and against public policy. This
line of reasoning would counsel that new policies and attitudes should
be embodied in a properly adopted amendment articulating the new. and
not by means of liberal interpretations which distort the old. Such
strict constructionism and logic are neither new nor unprecendented.
For example, in regard to the Federal Constitution and Acts there are
vigorous differences of opinion whether changed definitions and con-
cepts with respect to old constitutional and statutory provisions are to
be adopted."'
" See "Old Statutes and New Constitutions," by C. S. Lyon, 44 Columbia
Law Rev. 599.
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Yet actually the courts generally in recent times have adopted non-
literal and liberal interpretations in cases persuasively relevant. One of
the most instructive judicial decisions comes from our neighbor to the
East, Minnesota. Section 35, Article LV, of the Minnesota Constitution
says that any combination to monopolize the markets for food products
or to interfere with, or restrict the freedom of, such markets is a crim-
inal conspiracy. In the case of Minnesota Wheat Groriners' Coo#
Marketing Assoc. v. Huggins" , suit was brought by the Association to
enforce a membership contract made in harmony with the Minnesota
Co-operative Marketing Law. One of the defenses offered was the
contention that the Act contravened the article of the Minnesota Consti-
tution mentioned above. The Court held for the Association,-that the
complaint stated a good cause of action and that the contention of uncon-
stitutionality was not well taken. The Court terms the Co-operative
Marketing Act an enabling act (writers have called attention to the
frequency with which cooperative acts are called such as indicative of
a new departure in the law with respect to such associations.) and said
that its language must be liberally construed for the purpose of pro-
nooting the object. Conceding that if the Association bringing the suit
could raise or lower prices at will this would be a monopoly, the Court
finds that in fact it can by no means do this. The Court states: "This
provision of the Constitution is restrictive only. It says that persons
must not monopolize the markets for food products or interfere with or
restrict the freedom of such markets. . . . (it) does not say how mar-
keting shall be done; nor does it preclude regulation thereof. As indicated
above the Legislature has surrounded this law with every safeguard
against it possibly resulting in a monopoly, and if its declared lawful
purpose should by unscrupulous officials, be diverted into these illegal
transactions, which would subject it to the assault now made upon it, its
immediate death would be certain. The law is purely one of expediency.
and to better the economic condition of the producers. This statute
makes the association possible. The association frees the market, makes
it more open, less one-sided, less subject to. manipulation and monopoly
control on the part of those who deal in the commodities. It aids and
harmonizes with this constitutional provision, which is aimed at those
who hoard and speculate in food products and who interfere arbitrarily
and artificially with the natural flow of commerce in such products."
The Minnesota Court notes the widespread adoption of co-operative
marketing laws in the United States and the need for such, and it cate-
gorically finds no necessary monopoly or restraint of trade involved in
their connection. But if co-operative associations actually resort to
monopolistic practices or "abnormal conduct", then a sure and available
remedy exists for the public. The Court says, "In fact, this law puts the
association under the supervision of the public examiner, who is author-
ized to take possession of its property if he is of the opinion that its
further operation is hazardous to the public interest."
This last might be especially helpful in considering a hypothetical
North Dakota case raising questions similar to those under discussion in
the Minnesota case. In supposing that our Court would not depart far
from the views expressed by the Minnesota Court, we can also expect
our attention to be called to the likelihood that public interest is ade-
quately protected here against real and substantial monopolistic practices.
In the instances of unfair discriminations throughout the State, espec-
162 Minn., 471, 203 N.W. 420 (1925).
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ially as by depressing prices, remedies are provided under Chapter 4-14,
North Dakota Revised Code of 1943; while Chapter 10-16 of the same
Revised Code, dealing with. dissolution and annulment of corporations
should be broad enough to furnish the State with remedial measures
against baneful associations embarked upon careers inimical to the public
interest.
Co-operatives -today may be in restraint of trade and suffer remedial
consequences, but the chances of such possibilities materializing as
realities are relatively remote insofar as the usual and normal agricul-
tural co-operative is concerned.
